Constitutional Misconceptions by Rao, Radhika
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 93 Issue 6 
1995 
Constitutional Misconceptions 
Radhika Rao 
University of California, Hastings College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Law and Gender Commons, Science and Technology Law 
Commons, and the Sexuality and the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Radhika Rao, Constitutional Misconceptions, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1473 (1995). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol93/iss6/16 
 
This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
CONSTITUTIONAL MISCONCEPTIONS 
;Radhika Rao* 
CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGIES. By_ John A. Robertson. Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press. 1994. Pp. x, 281. $29.95. 
"59.:.Year-Old Woman Becomes a Mother";1 "Black mother, 
white baby: artificial conception stirs Europe[ an] debate";2 "South 
Africa Woman Gives Birth to 3 Grandchildren, and History";3 
"Healthy Baby Is Born After Test to Screen Out Deadly Gene";4 
"The Hot Debate About Cloning Human Embryos";s "Infertility 
doctors plan to use eggs from aborted foetuses."6 This bewildering 
barrage of headlines reveals a reproductive revolution in the mak-
ing. Children of Choice: Freedom and the New Reproductive Tech-
nologies ambitiously endeavors to shed light upon and bring order 
to the chaotic brave new world spawned by advances in reproduc-
tive technology. Professor John A. Robertson7 proposes a unifying 
principle - the presumptive primacy of procreative liberty - that 
is elegant in its simplicity. Applying this principle, he methodically 
canvasses each technology and concludes that almost every practice 
necessary to procreate should receive constitutional protection. He 
finds a constitutional right to reproduce technologically, to 
* Assistant Professor, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. A.B. 1986, 
J.D. 1990 Harvard - Ed. This review has benefited from conversations with and comments 
by Ashutosh Bhagwat, Jo Carillo, Mary Crossley, David Faigman, Laura Gomez, Joe Grodin, 
Angela Harris, Lisa Ikemoto, Ugo Mattei, Nell Newton, Kameshwar Poolla, and the partici-
pants in a faculty workshop at the 1995 Western Law Professors of Color Conference in San 
Diego. I would also like to thank Norene Lew, Hasan Shafiqullah, and Jenny Wald for their 
helpful research assistance. 
Postscript: For a wide range of critiques of Robertson's book published subsequent to the 
writing of this review, see the Symposium on John A. Robertson's Children of Choice, 52 
WASH. & LEE L REv. 133 (1995). 
1. A 59 Year-Old Woman Becomes a Mother, USA TODAY, Jan. 7, 1994, at 11A (cartoon). 
2. Black mother, white baby: artificial conception stirs Europe debate, S.F. ExAMINER, 
Jan. 1, 1994, at A-11. 
3. John D. Battersby, South Africa Woman Gives Birth to 3 Grandchildren, and History, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1987, at A9. 
4. Healthy Baby is Born After Test to Screen Out Deadly Gene, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1994, 
at A17. . 
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1993, at Al. 
6. Liz Lightfoot, Infertility doctors plan to use eggs from aborted foetuses, SUNDAY TIMES 
(London), Jan. 2, 1994, at 1. 
7. Thomas Watt Gregory Professor of Law at the University of Texas, Austin. 
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purchase sperm, eggs, and gestational services, and even to enforce 
preconception agreements to rear offspring. 
Robertson's principle of procreative liberty possesses merit as 
an ethical precept, but it falters as an axiom of constitutional law 
because it lacks a solid foundation in Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
In his effort to distill a single principle that encompasses myriad 
contexts, moreover, Roberton forgoes a more nuanced constitu-
tional analysis, one that takes into account the many ways in which 
individuals experience liberty in various categories and clauses of 
the Constitution. He focuses almost exclusively upon the right to 
procreate, overlooking other constitutional privacy interests, such 
as the right of body integrity and the right of parental autonomy. 
More fundamentally, Robertson's effort to constitutionalize 
conception is unavailing because global constitutional principles are 
ill-suited to resolve the problems posed by the new reproductive 
technologies. Perhaps for this reason, Robertson's approach, 
though cast in constitutional terms, traces its roots more closely to 
contractual principles. He conceives reproductive freedom in terms 
of an individual's right to participate in a free market - a market 
whose commodity is the means of producing children. In so doing, 
Robertson actually constitutionalizes freedom of contract in the 
name of protecting procreative rights. 
I. A CONSTITUTIONAL Rmm To PROCREATE BY 
ANY MEANS NECESSARY 
Robertson begins with a brief description of "the scope of the 
reproductive revolution that technological change has now 
wrought" (p. 4). The reproductive revolution originated in the 
1960s when the development of the pill made possible sex without 
procreation. This revolution has culminated in the 1990s with the 
development of technology that allows procreation without sex. 
"[T]he most visible marker of the technological reproductive 
revolution" was the birth of Louise Brown - the first child con-
ceived in a petri dish - in 1978 (p. 4). This birth proved to be just 
the vanguard of the revolution to come, foreshadowing modem re-
productive te~hnologies that enable individuals to control concep-
tion and manipulate offspring characteristics in ways previously 
unimaginable. "Like Caesar crossing the Rubicon," Robertson 
predicts, "there is no turning back from the technical control that 
we now have over human reproduction" (p. 5). As a result, "[t]he 
decision to have or not have children is ... no longer a matter of 
God or nature, but has been made subject to human will and tech-
nical expertise" (p. 5). The current sources of conflict in the repro-
ductive revolution include RU486, Norplant, frozen embryos, 
surrogate motherhood, genetic screening, manipulation of embryos, 
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forced caesarean section, criminal punishment of pregnant drug 
users, and fetal tissue transplants (p. 5). Robertson attempts to ad-
dress all of these issues, dividing them into four main categories 
that provide the structure of the book: avoiding reproduction, as-
sisted reproduction, quality control, and nonreproductive use of re-
productive capacity. 
Armed with his principle of procreative liberty - which pro-
tects "the freedom to decide whether or not to have offspring and 
to control the use of one's reproductive capacity" (p. 16) - Rob-
ertson enters the fray, mapping out a framework for resolving the 
controversies engendered by the new reproductive technologies. 
He defines procreative liberty as "the freedom to reproduce or not 
to reproduce in the genetic sense" (pp. 22-23), and extends the term 
to include gestation as well because "gestation is a central experi-
ence for women and should enjoy the special respect or protected 
status accorded reproductive activities" (p. 237 n.1 ). Procreative 
liberty, according to this view, consists of a negative right to be free 
from state interference, rather than a positive right to call upon the 
state to provide the means or resources necessary to exercise pro-
creative choice (p. 23). Robertson advocates the "presumptive pri-
macy of procreative liberty" (p. 22) because reproduction is 
"central to personal conceptions of meaning and identity" (p. 4). 
"To deny procreative choice," he believes, "is to deny or impose an 
all-encompassing reproductive experience on persons without their 
consent, thus denying them respect and dignity at the most basic 
level" (p. 220). 
Attempting to ground his principle of procreative liberty in the 
constitutional right to privacy, Robertson parses it into its compo-
nent parts - the right not to procreate and the right to procreate. 
The former aspect of procreative liberty finds a firm footing in 
Supreme Court precedents that clearly delineate a constitutional 
right to avoid reproduction by means of contraception8 and abor-
tion.9 Constitutional jurisprudence provides sketchy support, how-
ever, for the latter aspect of procreative liberty. Robertson points 
primarily to Skinner v. Oklahoma,10 a. case in which the Court 
struck down an Oklahoma statute authorizing forcible sterilization 
of thrice-convicted chicken-thieves. Relying upon Skinner and 
8. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (protecting the right of married 
couples to use contraceptives); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 {1972) (extending the right 
to use contraceptives to single persons). 
9. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 {1973) (establishing a woman's constitutional right to a 
previability abortion); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2804 (1992) (retaining 
and reaffirming the "essential holding" of Roe). 
10. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
1476 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 93:1473 
broad dicta from several other cases, 11 Robertson determines that 
"laws restricting coital reproduction by a married couple would 
have to withstand the strict scrutiny applied to interference with 
fundamental constitutional rights" (p. 36). 
Building upon his reading of the case law, Robertson makes the 
following argum~nt: if fertile persons possess a constitutional right 
to reproduce urider Skinner, then infertile persons must possess 
such a right as well because "the values and interests that undergird 
the right of coital reproduction clearly exist with the coitally infer-
tile" (p. 39). Drawing an analogy between infertility and blindness, 
he reasons that the inability to procreate sexually should not pre-
clude an infertile person from exercising the right to reproduce, just 
as the inability to see should not preclude a blind person from exer-
cising the First Amendment right to receive information. First 
Amendment protection should extend to books read by sight or by 
braille: "Similarly, if bearing, begetting, or parenting children is 
protected as part of personal privacy or liberty, those experiences 
should be protected whether they are achieved coitally or 
noncoitally" (p. 39). It follows that the right to procreate protected 
by Skinner encompasses "a negative constitutional right to use a 
wide variety of reproductive technologies to have offspring" (pp. 
38-39). Therefore, laws restricting the use of reproductive technol-
ogy must also withstand strict scrutiny. Robertson concludes, 
"Noncoital reproduction should thus be constitutiQnally protected 
to the same extent as is coital reproduction, with the state having 
the burden of showing severe harm if the practice is restricted" (p. 
39). Because such strong justifications seldom exist, Robertson be-
lieves that decisions about reproductive technology should almost 
always be left to the individual. 
Having established the presumptive primacy of procreative lib-
erty, Robertson proceeds to apply this principle to controversies in-
volving various reproductive technologies. He first addresses the 
battle over abortion, which pits a woman's presumptive right to ter-
minate her pregnancy against the claims of the fetus. For Robert-
son, the resolution to this conflict lies within the reach of new 
11. Robertson quotes sweeping pronouncements on the right to privacy delivered by the 
Court in cases such as Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (noting that constitutional 
liberty includes "the right of the individual •.• to marry, establish a home and bring up 
children"); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972} ("The rights to conceive and raise 
one's children have been deemed 'essential,' 'basic civil rights of man,' and 'rights far more 
precious ••• than property rights.'" (alteration in original} (citations omitted}); Eisenstadt, 
405 U.S. at 453 ("If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, 
married or single, to be free of unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so funda-
mentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."); and Casey, 112 
S. Ct. at 2807 ("Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to 
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education."). 
Pp. 36-37. 
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abortion technology. "[A] fertilized egg, embryo, or fetus cannot 
be a person or even a moral subject," he believes, "because it is too 
undeveloped biologically. In the earliest stages, it lacks differenti-
ated organs and a nervous system" (p. 51 ). Only at sentience -
which occurs near the time of viability - does a fetus become a 
moral subject in its own right. The viability line.embodies this "bio-
logical reality of progressive fetal development" (p. 53), whereas a 
position that "[c]all[s] all abortion 'murder' overlooks the very dif-
ferent biologic stages of embryonic and fetal development, and the 
moral distinctions that rest on them" (p. 48). Because "biological 
status is morally relevant" (p. 55) to Robertson, technology holds 
out the hope of ending the bitter battle over abortion. Robertson 
believes that "[p]reventing a fertilized egg from implanting or inter-
rupting implantation shortly after an embryo has developed is less 
morally or symbolically problematic than surgically destroying a 
much more developed fetus" (p. 64). Therefore, a new drug such as 
RU486 - which interrupts pregnancy at a very early stage - has 
the potential to "defuse some of the heat of the abortion contro-
versy" (pp. 63-64). 
Robertson next applies his principle of procreative liberty to 
proposed legislation to restrict irresponsible reproduction by means 
of new contraceptive technology. Such proposals focus upon the 
drug Norplant, a surgically-implanted contraceptive approved by 
the FDA in 1990, which Robertson believes to be safe, convenient, 
and effective at preventing pregnancy for up to five years.12 The 
12. Pp. 69-70. Robertson's optimism regarding the safety and convenience of Norplant, 
however, is by no means universal. Several class action lawsuits have been filed against Wy-
eth-Ayerst, the primary U.S. manufacturer of Norplant, alleging, inter alia, failure to warn 
women of the magnitude of the drug's side effects, which include headaches, weight gain, 
acne, nervousness, nausea, mood swings, dizziness, depression, hair gain or loss, heart palpi-
tations, enlargement of the ovaries and fallopian tubes, and irregular or increased bleeding. 
Norplant may carry additional risks, moreover, for women who suffer from diabetes, hyper-
tension, or kidney disease. Fmally, although Norplant's contraceptive effect is reversible 
once it is removed, extraction is not always the simple process Robertson describes, consist-
ing of just a small incision under local anesthetic in a quick procedure. P. 70. Instead, if the 
contraceptive implant migrates or scar tissue forms around it, removal may become ex-
tremely complicated. In some cases, removal can be accomplished only by means of surgery 
under general anesthesia. See Gina Kolata, Avalanche of Suits Hits Norplant, S.F. EXAM-
INER, May 28, 1995, at Al, A9; Tamar Lewin, Class Action Suit Says Norplant Hard to Re-
move, S.F. ClmoN., July 8, 1994, at A3; Norplant easier to get than to get rid of, say women 
suing its maker, Cm. TRIB., July 5, 1994, at 2; Shari Roan, Rising Legal Battles Tarnish Nor-
plant's Bright Promise, L.A. TrMEs, Oct 9, 1994, at A3; Jamie Talan, Norplant Lawsuits: 
Women Say Birth Control Implant Causes Side Effects, and Removal Can be Difficult, NEWS-
DAY, Aug. 30, 1994, at AS; Fawn Vrazo, Difficulties Surfacing for Norplant: Users Are Suing 
Over Pain and Scarring from its Removal, PmLADELPHIA INQUIRER, July 7, 1994, at Al; 
Karin Winegar, Norplant's Faded Promise, STAR TRIB., Sept. 18, 1994, at Al; see also Anita 
Hardon, Norplant: Conflicting Views on Its Safety and Acceptability, in ISSUES IN REPRODUC-
TIVE TECHNOLOGY I: AN ANTHOLOGY 11 (Helen B. Holmes ed., 1992). According to one 
woman, for example, it took five surgeries over the course of a year to extract a Norplant 
capsule intractably embedded in her arm .. Stephen Smith, Women Sue Manufacturer of Nor-
plant, MIAMI HERALD, July 19, 1994, at lBR. 
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author concludes that programs that encourage the voluntary use of 
Norplant, either by paying women on welfare a "bonus" to accept 
Norplant13 or by requiring them to use Norplant as a condition to 
receive welfare,14 do not infringe upon procreative liberty. 
Although a Norplant bonus "may be attractive enough to get a 
woman's attention and even influence her decision, it does not deny 
her something that she would otherwise receive, and thus should 
not be considered coercive" (pp. 87-88). Similarly, conditioning the 
receipt of welfare on Norplant use does not offend the Constitution 
because "a state has no constitutional obligation to provide welfare 
at all, [so] it would be free to provide it only if certain conditions 
rationally related to the program are met" (p. 89). Programs that 
make the use of Norplant compulsory, however, rather than tying it 
to the distribution of public funds, are unconstitutional because 
even convicted child-abusers, HIV-positive women, and teenagers 
possess "interests in procreation or bodily integrity which 
mandatory use of Norplant violates" (p. 93). Only severely re-
tarded women, who are "so mentally impaired that the concept of 
reproduction and parenthood has no meaning" (p. 90), may be 
forced to use Norplant because they lack the capacity to exercise 
procreative choice. For such women, Robertson believes, "the no-
tion of reproductive choice is no more meaningful ... than is electo-
ral choice" (p. 90). 
After analyzing technologies that prevent reproduction, Robert-
son turns his attention to those that facilitate procreation. He fo-
cuses his discussion upon in vitro fertilization (IVF), a procedure 
that involves collecting eggs surgically after ovarian stimulation, 
fertilizing them in the laboratory, and then implanting them in the 
uterus (p. 98). In order to maximize the probability of a pregnancy, 
Robertson explains, most IVF practitioners hyperstimulate the ova-
ries to retrieve multiple eggs (p. 99). If too many fertilized eggs are 
placed in the uterus at one time, however, there is an increased risk 
of multiple pregnancy, which may, in tum, require selective abor-
tion. Therefore, such practitioners usually implant only three or 
four embryos in the uterus; the extra embryos generated by the pro-
cess may be cryogenically frozen and later thawed for use in subse-
quent IVF cycles (p. 99). 
13. Legislation that would provide women on welfare with a cash bonus if they accept 
Norplant has been proposed in several states. E.g., H.R. 5130, 1994 Conn. Sess.; S. 2520, 
1994 Fla. Sess.; H.R. 2776, 1994 Kan. Sess. See generally Jeanne L. Vance, Note, Womb for 
Rent: Norplant and the Undoing of Poor Women, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 827 (1994). To 
date, none of these proposed statutes have been enacted into law. 
14. In two states - Florida and Mississippi - bills have been introduced that would 
condition receipt of welfare on a woman's consent to use Norplant. See Don't Use Norplant 
Against Welfare Mothers, USA TODAY, Feb. 16, 1993, at lOA; Barbara Kantrowitz & Pat 
\Vmgert, The Norplant Debate, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 15, 1993, at 36. See generally Vance, supra 
note 13, at 829 {describing proposed Norplant legislation). 
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Robertson predicts that a law banning IVF altogether "would 
no doubt be found unconstitutional because it [would] directly im-
pede[ ] the efforts of infertile married couples to have offspring, 
thus interfering with their fundamental right to procreate" (p. 100). 
But if the state cannot prohibit IVF directly, Robertson poses the 
question whether it could restrict the use of IVF indirectly "by lim-
iting the number of eggs that may be inseminated, banning discard, 
or requiring donation of unwanted embryos" (p. 108). He con-
cludes that it could not, even though current privacy doctrine leaves 
open the constitutionality of laws regulating extracorporeal 
embryos: . 
The constitutionality of laws that prevent the discard or destruction of 
IVF embryos is independent of the right to abortion established in 
Roe v. Wade and upheld in Planned Parenthood v. Casey . ... Under 
Roe-Casey the state would be free to treat external embryos as per-
sons or give as much protection to their potential life as it chooses, as 
long as it did not trench on a woman's bodily integrity . . . . [p. 108; 
footnote omitted] 
Nevertheless, embryo protection laws, "even if they do not infringe 
[upon] bodily integrity, do ... limit procreative choice" (p. 108). 
Because the efficient operation of IVF requires power to create and 
control spare embryos, Robertson reasons that the procreative lib-
erty right to use IVF implies both the right to create additional em-
bryos and the "right to give binding advance instructions" regarding 
the disposition of any unused embryos (pp. 106-07). 
Indeed, Robertson's principle of procreative liberty appears to 
possess no logical stopping point, expanding to the outer limits of 
technological possibility and human ingenuity. It protects not only 
the right to conceive by means of reproductive technologies such as 
IVF, but also the right to engage the services of reproductive col-
laborators, such as gamete donors and surrogates. If a couple lacks 
the physical capacity to conceive through coitus, Robertson con-
tends, the right to procreate "should include the right to use 
noncoital means of conception to form families" (p. 126). Likewise, 
"[i]f the couple lacks the gametes or gestational capacity to produce 
offspring, a commitment to procreative liberty should also permit 
them the freedom to enlist the assistance of willing donors and sur-
rogates" (p. 126). In the next stage of his analysis, Robertson im-
plicitly equates procreation with parenting: because couples 
procreate primarily in order to become parents, he reasons that an 
infertile couple's constitutional right to procreate with the assist-
ance of third parties "should include enforcement of preconception 
[agreements to rear the resulting child, such as] surrogate con-
tracts" (p. 131). In a final leap of logic, Robertson finds that the 
Constitution guarantees even the right to purchase the sperm, eggs, 
and gestational services supplied by gamete donors and surrogates. 
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A ban on payment would unconstitutionally interfere with the right 
to procreate because it might "prevent [infertile couples] from ob-
taining the collaborative services they need to rear biologically re-
lated offspring" (p. 141). Therefore, Robertson concludes, "[s]uch 
an infringement could be justified only if banning payment pre-
vented a substantial harm that clearly outweighed the burden on 
procreative choice. "ls 
Only at quality control technologies does Robertson draw the 
line, determining that some of these practices fall outside the scope 
of constitutionally protected procreative choice. He distinguishes 
between negative and positive interventions, finding this difference, 
"[l]ike the difference between killing and letting die ... [to be] mor-
ally weighty" (p. 160). He argues that negative interventions -
such as the discard of genetically undesirable embryos or sex-selec-
tive abortions - should be constitutionally protected because 
"[a]voiding conception or terminating an affected pregnancy rather 
than living with the burdens of handicapped birth would appear to 
be a central part of procreative liberty" (p. 150). "If discard of un-
wanted embryos is accepted," he reasons, then "discard on the basis 
of genetic traits should also be acceptable" (p. 156). In like vein he 
says, "[i]f abortion is accepted generally, then it should be available 
for genetic selection reasons as well" (p.159). Moreover, even pos-
itive interventions "designed to prevent serious disease or defect in 
expected offspring" merit constitutional protection as part of pro-
creative liberty (p. 161 ). 
Robertson's analysis leads him inevitably to the following di-
lemma: if the Constitution protects therapeutic intervention to cor-
rect a genetic disease or defect, what if "a gene for height, 
intelligence, coordination, beauty, or some other desirable charac-
teristic could be inserted in an embryo or fetus to enhance those 
characteristics in an otherwise normal, healthy child" (p. 165)? 
Robertson is reluctant to stretch his principle of procreative liberty 
15. P. 141. According to Robertson, none of the arguments for banning payment reach 
that level of justification. He first addresses the argument that commercializing reproduction 
may "exploit and depersonalize women, turning them into mere cogs in the machinery of 
reproduction" (p. 140), but he responds that "markets for the sale of gestational services are 
no more exploitive than the sale of other kinds of physical labor" (p. 141). "If people are 
free to sell their labor as petrochemical workers, cleaning persons, or construction workers in 
the hot Texas sun," Robertson inquires, "why should the sale of gestational services be 
treated any differently? Much paid labor is equally or even more risky to health." P. 141. A 
second argument against payment is that it commodifies women and children, transforming 
them into objects that may be bought and sold on the market. Robertson rejects this argu-
ment as well because it fails to explain "why certain attributes such as gestation and sexuality 
may not be sold, while other attributes, such as physical size, skill, attractiveness, and intellec-
tual prowess may be." P. 141. For these reasons, Robertson determines that "the need to 
protect female gestation from the taint of filthy lucre does not seem compelling enough to 
justify stopping infertile couples from obtaining the services they need to rear biologic off. 
spring." P. 142. 
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so far, recognizing that "[i]f everything material to a decision to 
reproduce is part of procreative liberty, then its scope would extend 
to [genetic] enhancement, cloning, and the Bladerunner scenario" 
of a genetically-engineered class of subnormal human beings (p. 
167). Desperately seeking some logical limit, he appeals to a "con-
stitutive notion of why reproduction is important" (p. 263 n.40). ·He 
finds this limit in "a core view of the goals and values of reproduc-
tion such that . . . procreative liberty would protect only actions 
designed to enable a couple to have normal, healthy offspring 
whom they intend to rear" (p. 167). On this view, "[a]ctions that 
aim to produce offspring that are more than normal (enhance-
ment), less than normal (Bladerunner), or replicas of other human 
genomes (cloning) [do] not fall Within procreative liberty because 
they deviate too far from the experiences that make reproduction a 
valued experience."16 Therefore, "prenatal interventions for non-
therapeutic enhancement, cloning, or diminishment of offspring will 
not be protected by procreative liberty because these actions 
conflict with the values that undergird respect for human 
reproduction."17 
Having found one limit to the principle of procreative liberty, 
Robertson readily discovers others. He determines that the right to 
procreate is not implicated by the regulation of conduct that poses 
the risk of prenatal harm to offspring. Although his principle of 
procreative liberty might seem broad enough to encompass, for ex-
ample, a woman's decision to smoke cigarettes or consume alcohol 
during the course of her pregnancy, Robertson concludes that it is 
not because "the core values that underlie procreative liberty . . . 
[do not] include[] the right to make offspring less than healthy and 
normal, when a healthy birth is reasonably possible" (p. 178). Rob-
ertson points out, however, that other constitutional rights such as 
"a woman's right of liberty and bodily integrity" may be infringed 
16. P. 167. Robertson refers to the replicants in the movie Bladerunner to illustrate his 
idea of a genetically-engineered class of subnonnal human beings (pp. 170-71), but these 
replicants could actually be deemed superior, genetically-enhanced beings. By highlighting 
the question of what is "normal," Robertson's reference to Bladerunner thus reveals the am-
biguity inherent in his "core view" of procreative liberty. 
17. P. 172. Robertson himself appe~ to recognize the arbitrariness of the line he has 
drawn when he asks "why only the interest in raising 'normal' children should be protected, if 
individuals find the same or greater meaning in raising supernormal children." P. 263 n.40. 
For, by his own reasoning, if procreative liberty is constitutionally protected "because of the 
importance of reproduction to personal identity and meaning'.' (p. 171), then the "right to 
procreate .•. [should] imply the right to take actions to assure that offspring have the charac-
teristics that make procreation desirable or meaningful for [a particular] individual" (p. 153), 
including genetic enhancement. Yet Robertson's only response to this question is that "[a]t 
some point a constitutive notion of why reproduction is important has to inform the debate, 
or else there are no limits to shaping offspring characteristics at all, not even when cloning or 
intentional diminishment is involved." P. 263 n.40. Robertson's failure to advance any the-
ory to justify his core view of the purpose of procreative liberty renders his belated attempts 
to confine his constitutional right to procreate inadequate. 
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by the regulation of maternal conduct during pregnancy, "not be-
cause it is reproductive, but because [a woman's] body and liberty 
... are involved."18 Nor does procreative liberty extend to 
nonreproductive uses of reproductive capacity, such as the creation 
of embryos for research or the deliberate conception and abortion 
of a fetus in order to obtain tissue for transplantation, although 
such uses might fall within the right to "liberty in the use of one's 
reproductive capacity" (p. 200). The principle of procreative liberty 
does, however, safeguard such practices when they are employed to 
produce a child, as they were by the Ayala family, who received 
national attention for their decision to conceive and give birth to 
one child for the purpose of providing bone marrow to another.19 
In sum, Robertson believes that "procreative liberty should include 
the right to have children for any motive, including to serve as a 
marrow donor, if such goals or uses of the child independently re-
spect that child's interests" (p. 217). 
After sketching out the ramifications of his constitutional princi-
ple of procreative liberty, Robertson finally recounts and rebuts 
three major critiques of this approach. First, the "class critique" 
capitalizes upon the fear that collaborative reproduction could re-
sult in "a breeder class of poor, minority women whose reproduc-
tive capacity is exploited" by the rich and powerful (pp. 226-27). 
Robertson responds by saying that "denying poorer women [such] 
opportunity . . . denies them a reproductive role which they find 
meaningful. Given that poorer women serve as nannies, babysit-
ters, housekeepers, and factory workers, gestational services might 
also be sold, even though it will offend the respect that some per-
sons have for maternal gestation" (p. 227). Second, the "feminist 
critique" suggests that such practices may "further patriarchal dom-
ination of women by reinforcing the traditional identification of 
women with childbearing and childrearing" (p. 228). According to 
18. P. 178. The fact that such regulation implicates the constitutional right to bodily in· 
tegrity is only the beginning and not the end of the inquiry, because no constitutional right is 
absolute: "At a certain point one's right to use one's body as one wishes .•• must take 
account of the interests of others •.•. " P. 179. Robertson points out that "(w]omen are in a 
special relationship with the fetus ..• because of its location inside their bodies" (p. 190); the 
special geography of pregnancy may warrant the imposition of a special duty to avoid in· 
flicting harm upon offspring prenatally. According to Robertson, such a duty would prohibit 
a pregnant woman from engaging in "actions [that] have very little benefit to her and pose 
great harm to offspring" or require her to accept medical treatments that are "moderately or 
minimally risky ... but will prevent great harm to offspring." P. 179. To impose such a duty, 
he argues, is not discrimination on the basis of gender so long as it is "[v]iewed broadly as a 
question of the parental duties of both men and women" to their offspring before and after 
birth. P. 192. Consistent with his vision of prenatal duties as just a subset of the obligations 
all parents owe to their children, Robertson would impose upon all parents "postnatal moral 
obligations to donate tissue when the risk/benefit ratio justifies the intrusion." P. 193. 
19. P. 214; see, e.g., Baby is Conceived to Save Daughter, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1990, at 10; 
Denise Hamilton, Woman Is Having Baby to Save Her Ailing Daughter, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 16, 
1990, at Al; Anastasia Toufexis, Creating a Child to Save Another, TIME, Mar. 5, 1990, at 56. 
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Robertson, this criticism falters because it fails to recognize that 
precisely the opposite result is likely: collaborative reproductive ar-
rangements actually upset and overturn gender-role stereotypes by 
"undercut[ ting] traditional notions of reproductive orthodoxy that 
identify women with gestation and childrearing" (p. 230). This ar-
gument also "overlooks the many ways in which technology offers 
options that expand the freedom of women . . . [and] assures 
women a large measure of control over their reproductive lives" (p. 
229). Collaborative reproduction, for example, affords infertile 
women the chance to experience the joys of gestating or rearing 
biologically related children, and it offers fertile women an oppor-
tunity to earn money by serving as surrogates. "On balance," Rob-
ertson concludes, "there is no reason to think that women do not 
end up with more rather than less reproductive freedom as a result 
of technological innovation" (p. 231). Third, the "communitarian 
critique" contends that "[ d]isaggregation and recombination of re-
productive components [may] undermine the traditional impor-
tance of genetic and gestational bonds" (p. 232), thereby 
contributing to the destruction of the traditional family. Robertson 
rejects this argument as well, avowing that "[r]ather than un-
dermin[ing] family, these practices present new variations of family 
and community that could help fill the void left by flux in the shape 
of the American family" (p. 233). 
II. A CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CRITIQUE 
To anyone acquainted with the burgeoning scholarship 
prompted by recent developments in reproductive technology, John 
Robertson is already a familiar name,20 and this work should add 
luster to his well-deserved reputation in this fertile field. To ad-
dress all of these issues in one comprehensive volume is itself an 
accomplishment, but Children of Choice does much more than that. 
It introduces and applies a coherent constitutional framework to 
the perplexing problems posed by the new reproductive 
technologies. 
20. See, e.g., John A. Robertson, Embryo Research, 24 W. ONTARIO L. REv. 15 (1986); 
John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the 
New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L REv. 942 (1986); John A. Robertson, Ethical and Legal 
Issues in Human Egg Donation, 52 FERTILIT'i AND STERILlTY 353 (1989); John A. Robertson, 
Fetal Tissue Transplants, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 443 (1988); John A. Robertson, In the Beginning: 
The Legal Status of Early Embryos, 76 VA. L. REv. 437 (1990); John A. Robertson, Posthu-
mous Reproduction, 69 IND. LJ. 1027 {1994); John A. Robertson, Prior Agreements for Dis-
position of Frozen Embryos, 51 Omo ST. L.J. 407 {1990); John A. Robertson, Procreative 
Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REv. 405 {1983); 
John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and Human Genetics, 39 EMORY L.J. 697 (1990); 
John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the State's Burden of Proof in Regulating 
Noncoital Reproduction, 16 LAw MED. & HEALTH CARE 18 {1988); John A. Robertson, The 
Question of Human Cloning, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 6; John A. Robert-
son, The Right to Procreate and In Utero Fetal Therapy, 3 J. LEGAL MED. 333 {1982). 
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Robertson's constitutional framework views the landscape of re-
productive conflict through the lens of procreative liberty, inquiring 
whether the constitutional right to procreate or avoid procreation 
encompasses each one of these new technologies. From the 
Supreme Court's decision to strike down a compulsory sterilization 
law in Skinner and from broad dicta in several other cases, Robert-
son derives "a negative constitutional right to use a wide variety of 
reproductive technologies to have offspring" (pp. 38-39). Based 
upon this freshly minted constitutional right, he extrapolates not 
only a constitutional right to employ gamete donors and surrogates 
to assist in the reproductive venture, but also a constitutional right 
to obtain court enforcement of preconception contracts that pur-
port to bargain away rearing rights to the resulting child.21 
Robertson erects this elaborate edifice upon Skinner, but Skin-
ner is too weak a reed to carry so much constitutional weight. As 
the sole precedent supporting the constitutional right to procreate, 
Skinner is indeterminate: the case may be read in several different 
ways, all of which are equally consistent with current constitutional 
doctrine.22 Just as the constitutional right to an abortion estab-
lished in Roe and reaffirmed in Casey does not preclude states from 
prohibiting the destruction of extracorporeal embryos,23 so the con-
stitutional right not to be sterilized announced in Skinner may not 
prevent states from regulating extracorporeal reproduction.24 The 
result in Skinner may simply rest upon the constitutional right to 
21. See supra text accompanying note 15. 
22. Some commentators contend, for example, that the right to privacy protects freedom 
of intimate association, rather than freedom of procreation. By this reasoning, "a supposed 
'fundamental right' to use a sperm bank would represent a particularly bold leap" and "a 
'right' to enforce a surrogacy contract against a woman who has changed her mind and 
wishes to keep her gestational child entails a leap across a constitutionally unbridgeable 
void." Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 
557 U. CHI. L. REv. 1057, 1108 (1990). 
23. Under current constitutional doctrine, state attempts to preserve the life of the fetus, 
even when it is within the woman's womb, are constitutional so long as they do not pose any 
additional risks to the woman's health. Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 485 
n.8 (1983) (upholding second-physician requirement during postviability abortions to provide 
additional protection for the life of the fetus); cf., Thornburgh v. American College of Obste-
tricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 768-69 (1986) (striking down requirement that phy-
sician use abortion technique with best chance for fetus to be aborted alive because it 
balanced the woman's health against the fetus' life). 
24. Skinner may not even establish a constitutional right to be free from sterilization. 
The compulsory sterilization law at issue in Skinner was struck down only because it discrimi-
nated between chicken-thieves and embezzlers. By locating the case in the Equal Protection 
Clause rather than the Due Process Clause, the Court implied that such laws are constit1.1-
tional so long as they treat all criminals equally. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 
(1942) ("[S]trict scrutiny of the classification which a State makes in a sterilization law is 
essential, lest unwittingly, or otherwise, invidious discriminations are made against groups or 
types of individuals in violation of the constitutional guaranty of just and equal laws .••• 
When the law lays an unequal hand on those who have committed intrinsically the same 
quality of offense and sterilizes one and not the other, it has made as invidious a discrimina-
tion as if it had selected a particular race or nationality for oppressive treatment."). 
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privacy of person, which prohibits state intrusions upon bodily in-
tegrity. If this is its rationale, then Skinner protects only the right to 
refuse abortion and carry a coital pregnancy to term, as well as the 
right to resist compulsory contraception or sterilization.25 Thus it is 
not at all clear that Skinner extends constitutional protection to 
noncoital methods of reproduction, such as artificial insemination 
and in vitro fertilization.26 
Moreover, recognition of a negative right to procreate does not 
imply a positive right to call upon the apparatus of the state for 
assistance in procreation.21 Therefore, even if Skinner does create a 
constitutional right to be free from state interference with the use 
of reproductive technology, it does not follow that the state pos-
sesses an affirmative obligation to assure the exercise of procreative 
choice by placing its prestige and power behind the enforcement of 
preconception contracts.28 If government need not supply the fi-
25. Even if Skinner is not cabined as a case involving bodily integrity, but stems instead 
from a broader right to privacy, Robertson offers no reason why this broader right to privacy 
should be interpreted to protect an individual's right to make decisions that are central to 
personhood, rather than to prevent the state from enacting regulations that affirmatively 
occupy individual's lives. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARv. L. REv. 737 
(1989) (distinguishing between personhood right to privacy and antitotalitarian right to pri-
vacy). According to Rubenfeld, "The anti-totalitarian right to privacy •.• prevents the state 
from imposing on individuals a defined identity, whereas the personhood right to privacy 
ensures that individuals are free to define their own identities." Id. at 794. This distinction is 
significant because, although both visions of privacy protect the right to abortion, only the 
personhood theory of privacy would prevent the state from enacting laws limiting reproduc-
tion. Id. at 797. 
26. The only other argument Robertson sets forth in support of the proposition that Skin-
ner extends constitutional protection to technological methods of procreation rests upon his 
analogy between infertility and blindness. See supra text accompanying note 11. This anal-
ogy, however, fails because it glosses over the critical fact that reproduction cannot be ac-
complished in isolation - it is an activity which necessarily implicates the rights of others. 
An appropriate analogy would ask not whether the First Amendment protects a blind per-
son's right to receive information by means of braille, but rather whether it protects a blind 
person's right to purchase the eyes of a sighted person. Certainly, no one would contend that 
the First Amendment right to receive information stretches so far. 
27. The Court has drawn the same distinction in the abortion funding cases. See, e.g., 
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980) (holding that the c0nstitutional right to an abor-
tion does not impose an affirmative obligation upon the government to provide the financial 
resources necessary to exercise the right by subsidizing abortions because, "although govern-
ment may not place obstacles in the path of a woman's exercise of her freedom of choice, it 
need not remove those not of its own creation."); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1977) 
(holding that the constitutional right to an abortion is only a negative "right protect[ing] the 
woman from ..• interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her preg-
nancy. It implies no limitation on the authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring 
childbirth over abortion, and to implement that judgment by the allocation of public funds."). 
28. Cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that the court enforcement of 
private racially restrictive covenants constitutes state action). Several commentators have 
made a similar point, arguing that the state has no affirmative obligation to enforce procrea-
tive contracts. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. 'TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 1360 (2d ed. 
1988) (suggesting that the state's ability "to withhold from would-be parents the financial 
means necessary for in vitro fertilization or artificial insemination" implies that the constitu-
tional right to privacy does not "automatically, entitle infertile couples ..• to buy genetic 
material from others or to contract" for gestational services); John Lawrence Hill, What Does 
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nancial resources necessary to exercise the right to procreate, it is 
not clear why government must supply the judicial resources neces-
sary to exercise the right either.29 Robertson attempts to evade the 
logic of the abortion funding cases by simply labelling state enforce-
ment of procreative contracts as a negative rather than a positive 
right (p. 23), yet he fails to provide any reason why this form of 
state assistance should be so characterized. Robertson could have 
argued as follows: state withdrawal from the procreative enterprise 
by means of selective refusal to enforce procreative contracts would 
interfere with the negative right to procreate in the same way that 
selective refusal to enforce contracts providing abortion services in 
exchange for payment would interfere with the negative right to 
abort. This argument depends, however, upon whether the state's 
decision not to enforce procreative contracts represents a deviation 
from traditional precepts of contract law or whether it comports 
with common law contract rules.30 In short, the line Robertson 
It Mean To Be a "Parent"? The Claims of Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. 
L REv. 353, 367 (1991) ("[T]he right of procreation elaborated in Skinner appears as a nega-
tive right to make procreational decisions without government interference. This is quite 
distinct from a positive right requiring government assistance to enforce reproductive-serv-
ices contracts between commissioning couples and surrogates."). 
29. More than one court has refused to enforce a surrogacy contract under this rationale. 
See, e.g., Doe v. Kelley, 307 N.W.2d 438 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that the fundamental 
right to bear or beget a child was not infringed by the state's refusal to enforce a surrogacy 
contract based upon state law prohibiting the payment of fees for adoption); In re Baby M, 
537 A.2d 1227, 1253-54 (NJ. 1988) (holding that the right of procreation does not require 
government enforcement of a surrogacy contract). · 
30. Under traditional principles of contract law, not all voluntary agreements are legally 
binding as contracts. Some promises are not enforced because they impair family relations, 
see McCoy v. Flynn, 151 N.W. 465 (Iowa 1915) (refusing to enforce a promise to pay $5,000 if 
the recipient remained unmarried for three years); Lowe v. Doremus, 87 A. 459 (N.J. 1913} 
(determining that a contract in general restraint of marriage is void), or because they require 
the performance of illicit personal services, see Troutman v. Southern Ry. Co., 441 F.2d 586, 
589 (5th Cir. 1971) (recognizing that "a contract to influence a public official in the exercise 
of his duties is illegal and unenforceable when that contract contemplates the use of personal 
influence"); Taylor v. Fields, 224 Cal. Rptr. 186 (Ct. App. 1986) (holding that a contract 
providing lifetime financial support in exchange for sexual services was unenforceable be-
cause based on illegal, meretricious consideration), or because they contravene public policy, 
see Gault v. Sideman, 191N.E.2d436, 443 (Ill. App. Ct. 1963) (denying enforcement of doc-
tor's express warranty to cure his patient because "ordinary rules dealing with mercantile 
contracts" should not be applied to a contract between a physician and a patient but instead 
the court should consider "a balance of the legal policies of protecting the public"); Capazzoli 
v. Holzwasser, 490 N.E.2d 420 (Mass. 1986) (holding that promise of financial support in 
exchange for prornisee's abandoning her marriage was unenforceable as a matter of public 
policy). Moreover, court enforcement of preconception agreements would not necessarily 
effectuate the parties' intentions in regard to raising the resulting child. A court would be 
more likely to remedy breach of such contracts by means of damages rather than specific 
performance - specific performance is usually viewed as an extraordinary remedy. See 
H.W. Gossard Co. v. Crosby, 109 N.W. 483, 486 (Iowa 1906) (stating that it is a "universally 
recognized general rule" that damages are the sole remedy for breach of a "contract to per-
form personal service"). Indeed, a court's failure to order specific performance of procrea-
tive contracts could hardly be construed as a departure from general contract principles. See, 
e.g., Foxx v. Williams, 52 Cal. Rptr. 896 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (refusing to specifically enforce 
a contract by compelling employee to continue to provide services to employer); Fitzpatrick 
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draws between negative and positive procreative rights is less clear 
than he suggests. 31 
Yet the real problem with interpreting the constitutional right to 
procreate to require court enforcement of preconception contracts 
is not a question of semantics - of whether the right is labelled 
positive or negative. Rather, it is that recognition of such an expan-
sive version of the right to procreate may diminish other constitu-
tional rights and disregard the constitutional rights of others. 
Robertson's reading of this right conflates procreation and parent-
ing, but the two are distinct. Even if Skinner supports a constitu-
tional right to procreate, therefore, parental prerogatives need not 
follow. The right to reproduce does not necessarily entail the right 
to rear one's biological child.32 Should one right accompany the 
other, moreover, how do we determine which procreator - the 
gamete contributors, the gestator, or the intending parents - pos-
sesses these related rights? Robertson candidly acknowledges these 
difficult questions .when he asks: 
Are couples who use these techniques 'procreating' in a significant 
way, even though one of them may lack a genetic or biological con-
nection to offspring? Is a collaborator meaningfully procreating if he 
or she is merely providing gametes or gestation without any rearing 
role? Do such limited procreative roles deserve the same respect and 
protection that traditional coital reproduction warrants? [p. 120] 
These questions are often more illuminating and instructive than 
any available answers. 
Robertson's difficulties stem from the fact that constitutional 
rights "have a way of bumping into each other in cases involving 
husbands, wives, and unmarried individuals when all are claiming 
parental rights."33 Protecting the parental rights of one procreator 
v. Michael, 9 A.2d 639 (Md. a. App. 1939) (declining to specifically enforce a contract prom-
ising to render nursing and caretaking services during employer's lifetime in exchange for a 
substantial interest in his estate after his death). 
31. Like the question of whether governmental action imposes a penalty or withdraws a 
subsidy, the characterization of a constitutional right as negative or positive also depends 
upon the baseline against which it is measured. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitu-
tional Conditions, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1415 (1989) (arguing that the characterization of un-
constitutional conditions as "coercive" is a conclusory label that draws upon a normative 
baseline); Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law (With Special Reference to Por-
nography, Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92 CoLUM. L. REv. 1, 9 (1992) (arguing that "the de-
scription of a right as positive or negative depends on the baseline"). 
32. As the New Jersey Supreme Court noted in Baby M: 
The right to procreate very simply is the right to have natural children, whether through 
sexual intercourse or artificial insemination. It is no more than that. Mr. Stern has not 
been deprived of that right. Through artificial insemination of Mrs. Whitehead, Baby M 
is his child. The custody, care, companionship, and nurturing that follow birth are not 
parts of the right to procreation. 
537 A.2d at 1227. 
33. Anna J. v. Mark C., 286 Cal. Rptr. 369, 380 (Ct. App. 1991). 
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risks denying the rights of other procreators. As the New Jersey 
Supreme Court stated in Baby M: 
To assert that Mr. Stem's right of procreation gives him the right to 
the custody of Baby M would be to assert that Mrs. Whitehead's right 
of procreation does not give her the right to the custody of Baby M; it 
would be to assert that the constitutional right of procreation includes 
within it a constitutionally protected contractual right to destroy 
someone else's. right of procreation.34 
By requiring a court to enforce a preconception agreement that 
would wrest a child from the arms of one biological parent and 
transfer her to the home of another, Robertson's right to procreate 
has become so broad as to impinge upon parental rights.3s Such a 
sweeping right of reproduction threatens to .swallow up other con-
stitutional privacy rights. 
All these weaknesses evidence a deeper flaw in Robertson's all-
encompassing constitutional framework. Robertson strives to re-
duce the manifold issues raised by the new reproductive technolo-
gies to one constitutional right. In his search for simplicity, 
however, he forgoes a more nuanced constitutional analysis. He 
relies almost exclusively upon one constitutional principle -· the 
primacy of procreative liberty. Yet a comprehensive constitutional 
analysis cannot apply procreational privacy rights in isolation; 
rather, it must take into account all of the ways in which an individ-
ual experiences liberty in various categories and clauses of the Con-
stitution. 36 At a minimum, it must reconcile the right to privacy of 
procreation with two other elements of the constitutional right to 
privacy, which I shall term privacy of person37 and privacy of 
34. 537 A.2d at 1254. 
35. Robertson concedes this flaw in his analysis, but he attributes it to his focus upon 
constitutional rights, rather than to the incompleteness of his constitutional analysis. He ac-
knowledges that "[a] rights-based perspective tends to view reproduction as an isolated, indi-
vidual act without effect on others" (p. 223), and he seems to believe that a communitarian 
model might better reflect the fact that 
reproduction is the act that most clearly implicates community and other persons. Re-
production ... always occurs with a partner, even if that partner is an anonymous egg or 
sperm donor . . . . Its occurrence also directly affects others by creating a new person 
who in tum affects them and society in various ways. 
P. 223. According to Robertson, "[e]mphasizing procreative rights thus risks denying the 
central, social dimensions of reproduction." P. 223. But it is in his failure to respect other 
constitutional rights and to acknowledge the constitutional rights of others - not his applica-
tion of a rights-based model - that Robertson denies the central social dimensions of 
reproduction. 
36. See David L. Faigman, Measuring Constitutionality Transactionally, 45 HASTINGS LJ. 
753 (1994) (arguing for a transactional approach to constitutional adjudication that would 
require courts to aggregate constitutional rights, rather than measure liberty in a fractured 
and myopic way through the constricting lenses of individual amendments). 
37. A long line of cases establishes this right to privacy of person, guaranteeing freedom 
\ from physical intrusions upon an individual's body. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Missouri 
Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990) ("No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully 
guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control 
of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and un· 
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parenting.38 Robertson's framework falls short because it focuses 
upon procreational privacy, seldom considering personal privacy 
and ahllost entirely ignoring parental privacy. 
m. TowARri A 'NEW TAXONOMY 
The new reproductive technologies enable humans to wield un-
precedented power over the process of reproduction, making it pos-
sible to bring to life strange science-fiction scenarios. In so doing, 
they overturn settled notions of what is "natural" and call into 
question traditional doctrinal categories. No single legal frame-
work clearly governs these technologies. Instead, they hang in a 
legal limbo, fitting neatly into no existing taxonomy.39 Constitu-
questionable authority of law." (quoting Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 
(1891))); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990) (declaring that prisoners possess 
a "significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of anti-psychotic 
drugs"); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 764 (1984) (stating that forcible removal of a bullet 
from an accused person's body "would be an 'extensive' intrusion on [his] personal privacy 
and bodily integrity"); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-74 {1952) (holding that forced 
stomach-pumping of accused to extract evidence "shocks the conscience" in violation of the 
Due Process Clause); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). The abortion cases, 
themselves, stand at the intersection of two aspects of the right to privacy: they may be 
co~trued as flowing from both privacy of person and privacy of procreation. See Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. a. 2791, 2810 (1991) ("Roe •.. may be seen not only as an 
exemplar of Griswold liberty but as a rule .•. of personal autonomy and bodily integrity, with 
doctrinal affinity to cases recognizing limits on governmental power to mandate medical 
treatment or to bar its rejection."). 
38. The right to be free from state interference with parentai autonomy possesses an 
equally ancient pedigree. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (striking down 
state statute prohibiting parents from teaching ·children foreign languages); Pierce v. Society 
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (overturning statute requiring parents to send children to pub-
lic school); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (invalidating statute that automatically 
deprived unwed biological fathers of their children upon the mother's death); Quilloin v. 
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (upholding state law allowing biological mother's husband to 
adopt child over objection of biological father who had never resided with the child); Caban 
v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (striking down state law which gave biological mother of 
child veto power over adoption proceeding, while giving unwed biological father· who en-
joyed close relationship with the child only the right to show that the adoption would not be 
in the child's best interests); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (requiring clear and 
convincing evidence of abuse or neglect before state can constitutionally terminate parental 
rights); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 {1983) (sustaining statute granting more procedural 
rights to biological mother of child than to biolpgical father who lacked a substantial relation-
ship with the child). Several cases suggest that this right to privacy of parenting does not 
extend, however, to procreators who claim parental rights in opposition to an intact marital 
family, see Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (upholding statute enacting conclu-
sive presumption that the husband of a child born to a married woman is the child's father, 
thereby denying parental rights to biological father who had lived with the child), or to care-
takers who lack a biological or legal connection to the child, see Reno v. Flores, 113 S. Ct. 
1439 (1993) (determining that illegal alien children detained by government have no right to 
be released to unrelated adults); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 
(1977) (sustaining state procedures that allowed children to be removed from foster families 
with whom they resided for more than one year without prior hearing). 
39. The new reproductive technologies challenge our basic structures of classification. 
They are like "flying squirrels," which are ''not unambiguously birds nor animals" and thus 
"are avoided by discriminating adults." Michael H. Shapiro, Fragmenting and Reassembling 
the World: Of Flying Squirrels, Augmented Persons, and Other Monsters, 51 Omo ST. LJ. 
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tional law represents one approach to adjudicating the conflicts 
such technologies create, but there are several others that I shall 
now classify and describe.40 Different courts and commentators ap-
pear to employ different doctrinal discourses, often without any ex-
planation or justification of their choices. Each doctrinal model 
poses dramatically different questions, and each may yield different 
answers. 
The first such model, the property law model, focuses upon the 
initial allocation of the entitlement: it asks who owns the property 
interest. In Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 41 a 
case involving ownership of the human body, Moore alleged that 
the unauthorized use of his spleen cells to create a valuable cell line 
constituted tortious interference with his property. The California 
Supreme Court rejected his claim, ruling that the patented cell line 
was "the product of invention," owned by those who labored to 
create it and not by Moore, who merely supplied "the naturally oc-
curring raw materials."42 Yet the issue of ownership is only the be-
ginning of the property law inquiry. Once ownership is established, 
the question remains whether a particular property interest is alien-
able - whether it can be freely purchased and sold on the mar-
ket.43 Much of the property law scholarship regarding the new 
reproductive technologies has revolved around this very question.44 
331, 338 (1990) (quoting MARY DOUGLAS, PuRITY AND DANGER: AN ANALYSIS OF CON· 
CEP!S OF POLLUTION AND TABOO 196-97 (Pelican ed. 1966)). 
40. My description tends to artificially exaggerate the differences between these doctrinal 
models in order to sharpen their essential characteristics. In reality, however, the boundaries 
between these different modes of discourse are much more fluid. For a good description of 
the blurring of boundaries between conceptual categories, see Elizabeth Mensch, The History 
of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE POLITICS OF LAw: A PROGRESSIVE CRmouE 13, 23-
27 (David Kairys ed., 1990); see also Ronald Chester & Scott E. Alumbaugh, Functionalizing 
First-Year Legal Education: Toward a New Pedagogical Jurisprudence, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REv. 21, 26-27, 36-37 (1991) (arguing that as courts borrow "concepts from one doctrinal 
category of law to further the development of another ••• the increased borrowing is slowly 
breaking down the artificial separation of common-law doctrines"); Duncan Kennedy, The 
Political Significance of the Structure of the Law School Curriculum, 14 SETON HALL L. REV. 
1, 12-16 (1983) (contending that contracts, property, and torts are not doctrinally consistent 
or coherent but rather are riven by contradictions); Peter Linzer, The Decline of Assent: At-
Will Employment as a Case Study of the Breakdown of Private Law Theory, 20 GA. L. REv. 
323, 326 (1986) (stating that "the traditional approaches to tort, contract, and property are 
wrong, and that private law is a relatively seamless area"). 
41. 793 p .2d 479 (Cal. 1990). 
42. Moore, 793 P.2d at 493. 
43. In his dissent in Moore, for example, Justice Mosk stated: 
[T]he concept of property is often said to refer to a "bundle of rights" that may be 
exercised with respect to that object - principally the rights to possess the property, to 
use the property, to exclude others from the property, and to dispose of the property by 
sale or by gift. •.• But the same bundle of rights does not attach to all forms of property. 
For a variety of policy reasons, the law limits or even forbids the exercise of certain 
rights over certain forms of property. 
793 P.2d at 509. 
44. See, e.g., Margaret J. Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1849 (1987). 
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The paradigm case involving application of a property law 
model to reproductive technology is Davis v. Davis, 45 which in-
volved a divorced couple's dispute over seven cryogenically frozen 
embryos. In this case, the Tennessee Supreme Court disavowed 
property law terminology, stating that "preembryos are not, strictly 
speaking, either 'persons' or 'property,' but occupy an interim cate-
gory that entitles them to special respect because of their potential 
for human life."46 Nevertheless, by concentrating upon the ques-
tion of initial ownership, the court implicitly adopted a property law 
approach. Indeed, the court expressly acknowledged that the gam-
ete contributors did possess "an interest in the nature of ownership, 
to the extent that they have decision-making authority concerning 
disposition of the preembryos, within the scope of policy set by 
law."47 
The property law model thus frames the issues around owner-
ship and the attributes that accompany ownership. Applied to the 
problem of collaborative reproduction, for example, the property 
law model would ask who owns the product of reproductive efforts 
and what that ownership entails.48 Of course, the property law 
model does not provide a determinate answer to these questions, 
because at least three distinct parties - the two gamete contribu-
tors and the gestator - possess tenable claims to "ownership" by 
virtue of property law theories, the former based upon their invest-
ment of genetic resources in the reproductive venture and the latter 
based upon her labor in gestating and delivering the child. 
The second model, the family law model, also focuses upon the 
initial allocation of entitleme~ts, but from the perspective of the 
child. This model poses two critical questions: first, who are the 
child's "parents," and second, which placement serves the child's 
45. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992). 
46. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597. 
47. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597; see also York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989) 
(holding that cryopreservation agreement created a bailment relationship between couple 
and fertility clinic, obligating the clinic to return the subject of the bailment - one frozen 
embryo - to its owners once the purpose of the bailment had terminated); Hecht v. Superior 
Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Ct App. 1993) (holding that sperm stored in sperm bank is 
"property" to be distributed by the probate court according to the intent of the decedent as 
expressed in his will). 
48. This model has been severely criticized for applying the language of ownership to 
issues that many believe should not be conceived in these terms. See Radin, supra note 44, at 
1884-85 ("Market rhetoric, the rhetoric of alienability of all 'goods,' is also the rhetoric of 
alienation of ourselves from what we can be as persons."). 
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best interests.49 In In re Baby M,so the New Jersey Supreme Court 
adopted what is essentially a family law approach to resolve the 
problems created by a surrogacy arrangement that soured. Re-
jecting the surrogacy contract as unenforceable, the court adjudi-
cated the case as if it were a custody dispute over a coitally-
produced child.s1 After determining that the two biological 
progenitors were the child's parents, the court held 'that the child's 
best interests required that she reside with her biological father, but 
awarded visitation rights to her biological mother.s2 
The family law model is equally incapable of providing precise 
answers to the problems posed by collaborative reproduction, how-
ever, because it remains unclear what should count in determining 
parenthood. In Johnson v. Calvert, s3 for example, the California 
Supreme Court confronted the question who is the mother of a 
child conceived from the egg of one woman ~ut gestated in the 
womb of another. The child's biological progenitors, moreover, are 
not the only candidates for parental status.s4 Several commentators 
have advocated an "intentional" theory of parenthood, one that 
would privilege the intent to parent over status-based biological ties 
to the child.ss Thus the distinctive characteristic of the family law 
49. See Vicki C. Jackson, Baby M and the Question of Parenthood, 16 GEo. L.J. 1811, 
1827 (1988) ("Once we know who the 'parents' of a surrogate-born child are, then custody 
disputes can reasonably be detennined under the individual child-oriented 'best interests' 
standard of family law."). For another good example of the family law model, see Judith 
Areen, Baby M Reconsidered, 76 GEo. LJ. 1741, 1758 (1988) ("[W]hen custody disputes 
arise following surrogacy, it is the altruistic ethic of family law that should guide the court, 
not the ethic of self-gratification of the marketplace and contract law."). 
50. 537 A.2d 1227 (NJ. 1988). 
51. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1255-56. 
52. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1261-63. 
53. 851. P .2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (holding that each woman presented acceptable proof of 
maternity and therefore determining the ''natural mother" to be the woman who originally 
intended to rear the child). 
54. See Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991) (denying visitation rights to 
woman who intended to parent child born through artificial insemination of her partner be-
cause she did not qualify as a "parent" under New York law). 
55. Such arguments blur the boundaries between family law and contract law by predicat-
ing parental status upon contractually-embodied intentions. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 28 (ar-
guing that intending parents should prevail over those who assert parental rights based upon 
a genetic or gestational relationship to the child); Marjorie Maguire Schultz, Reproductive 
Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood, 1990 Wis. L ~v. 297, 321-69 (arguing for rules 
that determine legal parenthood based upon individual intentions regarding procreation and 
parenting); Andrea E. Stumpf, Note, Redefining Mother: A Legal Matrix for New Reproduc-
tive Technologies, 96 YALE L.J. 187, 194-201 (1986) (arguing for the intentional definition of 
parenthood). 
In her dissent in Alison D., Judge Judith Kaye appeared willing to accept these arguments 
and extend parental status to intentional parents, criticizing the New York Court of Ap-
peals's decision for "fixing biology as the key to visitation rights" and advocating a broader 
definition of parenthood. 572 N.E.2d at 30 (footnote omitted). Accordingly, Judge Kaye 
would have remanded the case to the lower court to detennine whether Alison D. was a 
"parent" to the child and, if so, whether visitation was in the child's best interests. Alison D., 
572 N.E.2d at 33. 
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model inheres in its centering of the discourse around the issue of 
parenthood.56 Yet different courts and commentators may arrive at 
different answers to the question who is a parent, some based upon 
biological connections and others based upon the significance of the 
bond that has developed or the clarity of the parties' intentions. 
The third model, the constitutional law model, speaks in the lan-
guage of rights, not in the language of ownership or parenthood. 
The constitutional law model asks which constitutional rights are 
being exercised, and by whom.57 In Baby M,5s for example, the 
trial court ruled that the state?s refusal to enforce a surrogacy con-
tract would violate an infertile couple's constitutional right to pri-
vacy.59 The constitutional right to privacy, however, fails to furnish 
easy answers to these questions, for collaborative reproduction im-
plicates three distinct strands of the privacy right - privacy of per-
son, privacy of procreation, and privacy of parenting. In a typical 
surrogacy contract, for example, the surrogate mother promises, in 
exchange for payment, (i) to refrain from smoking cigarettes, drink-
ing alcoholic beverages, or ingesting other substances harmful to 
the fetus; (ii) to abort if the fetus is physiologically abnormal, but 
otherwise to carry the pregnancy to term; and (iii) to relinquish her 
parental rights to the resulting child after birth.60 Such a contract 
involves conflicting constitutional rights. A holding that the infer-
tile couple's right to procreate requires enforcement of such a con-
tract would deny the surrogate her constitutionally protected rights 
to be free from physical invasions into her body and to raise her 
biological child. Therefore, a court presented with such a contract 
cannot simply consider procreational privacy in isolation; rather, it 
must untangle and reconcile the three strands of the constitutional 
56. See generally Janet L. Dolgin, Just a Gene: Judicial Assumptions About Parenthood, 
40 UCLA L. REv. 637 (1993) (examining assumptions underlying courts' analysis of ques-
tions of parenthood in unwed father and surrogate mother cases). 
57. See Anita L. Allen, Privacy, Surrogacy, and the Baby M Case, 76 GEO. L.J. 1759, 1775 
(1988) (describing four models of privacy-right attribution in the surrogacy context: privacy 
rights can be viewed as belonging to either (1) the childless couple, (2) the biological father, 
(3) the contractual couple, or (4) the surrogate mother). 
58. In re Baby M, 525 A.2d 1128 (NJ. Super. a. Ch. Div. 1987). 
59. 525 A.2d at 1164-65. Trial court Judge Sorkow's reasoning is strongly reminiscent of 
Robertson's: 
[I]f one has a right to procreate coitaJJy, then one has the right to reproduce non-coitally. 
If it is the reproduction that is protected, then the means of reproduction are also to be 
protected • . • • This court holds that the protected means extend to the use of surro-
gates .•.. It might even be argued that refusal to enforce these contracts and prohibition 
of money payments would constitute an unconstitutional interference with procreative 
liberty since it would prevent childless couples from obtaining the means with which to 
have families. 
Baby M, 525 A.2d at 1164-1165 (1987). 
60. See Katie Marie Brophy, A Surrogate Mother Contract to Bear a Child, 20 J. FAM. L. 
263 (1982) (describing provisions of a sample surrogate mother contract). 
1494 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 93:1473 
right to privacy.61 The very agreement that enhances the infertile 
couple's constitutional right to privacy of procreation may impair 
the surrogate mother's constitutional rights to privacy of person 
and privacy of parenting. A clash of constitutional rights can be 
averted only by determining that the surrogate's constitutional right 
to procreate includes the power to alienate her constitutionally pro-
tected personal and parental privacy rights. For this reason, issues 
of waiver and alienability of constitutional privacy rights lie at the 
core of the constitutional law model.62 
The last model differs from the other three models because, in 
the Coasian world of contract, the initial allocation of entitlements 
is not binding - the parties are free to bargain around them. 63 
Under the contract law model, therefore, the important question is 
not who originally owns the entitlement, but rather what the parties 
intend. It assumes freedom of contract, and therefore requires no 
justification of the alienability of the underlying entitlement. Sev-
eral commentators have applied a version of the contract law ap-
proach to disputes involving the new reproductive technologies, 
arguing for legal protection of intentions rather than biological con-
nections to the child.64 Some of these commentators appear to ad-
vocate a pure contract law model,65 but others recommend contract 
with an overlay of required terms in order to enhance efficiency.66 
Robertson's constitutional framework defines the right to pro-
create as the right to create genetically or gestationally connected 
progeny. In so doing, it specifies that the initial entitlement belongs 
61. Along these lines, Allen states that "[c]ourts relying upon privacy arguments must 
seek to acknowledge all the privacy claims, dispel all the ambiguity about who is asserting 
them, and then decide which claims to legitimate." Allen, supra note S7, at 1782. 
62. I shall use the term "waiver" to refer to relinquishment of a constitutional right and 
"alienation" to refer to the transfer or sale of a right to another party. See Seth Kreimer, 
Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. 
R.E.v. 1293, 1386 (1984) {distinguishing between waiver, which is the choice not to exercise a 
right, and alienation, which is the transfer of a right in exchange for a benefit). 
63. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 16 {1960) (setting 
forth the Coase theorem, which holds that, in the absence of transaction costs, the initial 
allocation of entitlements is not determinative because the parties can freely bargain to 
achieve an efficient allocation). 
64. See, e.g., CARMEL SHALEv, BIRlH POWER: THE CASE FOR SURROGACY {1989) (argu· 
ing that it is consistent with feminism for women to be able to use their reproductive capacity 
to earn money and power); Schultz, supra note SS. 
6S. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Ethics and Economics of Enforcing Contracts of 
Surrogate Motherhood, S J. CoNTEMP. liEALlH L. & POLY. 21 {1989). 
66. See Peter H. Schuck, Some Reflections on the Baby M Case, 16 GEO. L.J. 1793, 1809 
{1988) ("[A] regime of private contract, constrained and modified by a small number of legis· 
lated rules and enforceable in the courts, should protect the relevant private and social values 
implicated by surrogacy." {footnote omitted)). State regulations of surrogacy contracts might 
require, for example, that the parties sign the contract in the presence of a designated public 
official, after psychological testing and counseling, and that there be a mandatory postsigning 
but preconception "cooling off" period during which either party is free to renounce the 
contract. See id. at 180S-06. 
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to those who are biologically reproducing. But by assuming with-
out justifying why it is that this entitlement can be bargained away, 
Robertson seems to be operating in the Coasian world of contract 
and not in the realm of constitutional rights.67 Though it employs 
the rhetoric of rights, Robertson's constitutional model reveals it-
self to be a version of the contract law model. It concentrates upon 
policy questions central to contract law, ignoring or overlooking the 
question of the alienability of constitutional rights that lies at the 
core of constitutional law. Robertson: has simply constitutionalized 
freedom of contract in the name of advancing reproductive rights.6s 
Perhaps Robertson reverts to contract law because of the awk-
wardness of constitutional law in adjudicating family. conflicts. 
Constitutional law's strength lies in addressing disputes that pit the 
individual against the state. Cases that present a multiplicity of 
conflicting rights and a plethora of adverse parties, however, are 
less readily resolved by resort to global constitutional principles.69 
The new reproductive technologies, moreover, raise issues too com-
67. Unlike the Coasian world of contract, in which entitlements are presumed alienable, 
in the realm of constitutional rights, some rights cannot be relinquished and others can be 
waived but not purchased and sold on the market. The idea of inalienable rights is deeply 
rooted in American constitutional law. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 
(U.S. 1776); Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 451 (1874) ("A man may not 
barter away his life or his freedom, or his substantial rights."); Townsend v. Townsend, 7 
Tenn. (Peck) 1, 10 (1821) ("Constitutional rights are vested, unexchangeable, and unalien-
able."). Seth Kreimer notes that "the concept of inalienable rights is scarcely foreign to con-
stitutional thinking" and that "there are constitutional rights that we do regard as 
inalienable." Kreimer, supra note 62, at 1386. The peonage cases, for example, demonstrate 
that the Thirteenth Amendment protects the inalienable right not to be a slave. See, e.g., 
Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911) (holding that the Thirteenth Amendment barred 
Alabama from enforcing a voluntary contract of employment by imposing criminal penalties 
on the employee for its breach); Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905). Diapa Meyers 
believes that inalienable rights also include the right to life, the right to personal liberty, the 
right not to suffer gratuitous pain, and the right to satisfaction of basic needs, such as food, 
water, clothing, shelter, and the medical care needed for survival. DIANA T. MEYERS, INA-
LIENABLE RmHrS: A DEFENSE 53 (1985). The process by which we should determine what 
rights are inalienable is far from clear, but Laurence Tribe offers some guidelines. He argues 
that "rights that are relational and systemic are necessarily inalienable: individuals cannot 
waive them because individuals are not their sole focus." Laurence H. Tribe, The Abortion 
Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmative Duties, and the Dilemma of Depen-
dence, 99 HARV. L REv. 330, 333 (1985); see also Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, 
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. 
REV. 1089, 1111-15 (1972) (describing efficiency justifications for inalienability, such as exter-
nalities and paternalistic or moralistic concerns); Radin, supra note 44 (arguing for inaliena-
bility based upon aspiration for noncommodification); Note, Rumpelstiltskin Revisited: The 
Inalienable Rights of Surrogate Mothers, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1936, 1941-49 (1986) (contending 
that rights central to personhood are inalienable). 
68. In so doing, Robertson appears to be resurrecting the now-discredited Lochnerian 
notion that the right to make and enforce contracts is enshrined in the Constitution. See 
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Robertson, however, would safeguard freedom of 
contract in order to advance procreational privacy rather than economic liberty. 
69. See earl E. Schneider, Rights Discourse and Neonatal Euthanasia, 16 CAL. L REV. 
151, 157 (1988). Schneider has argued that 
when we in America think about rights, we tend to think in terms of the 'Mill paradigm.' 
That is, we think in terms of the state's regulation of a person's actions. In such conflicts, 
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plex to be decided according to constitutional principles that per-
manently balance basic values, setting them in constitutional stone. 
Robertson's quest to constitutionalize conception is misguided be-
cause it would freeze the law in an area of rapidly developing tech-
nology with as yet unknown and potentially far-reaching 
implications for society. 
The selection of a doctrinal framework thus sets the terI)ls of the 
debate. The property law model stimulates discussion on the issue 
of ownership of the human body; the family law model encourages 
exploration of the meaning of parenthood; the constitutional law 
model probes the dimensions of constitutional privacy rights and 
their alienability; and the contract law model presumes alienability 
but inquires as to what market regulations enhance efficiency.10 
Each model's distinctiveness lies in the questions it asks and not 
necessarily in the answers it supplies. The selection of a particular 
model matters because legal rhetoric transmits cultural messages 
about the values of our society.71 As Mary Ann Glendon observes, 
"the way we name things and discuss them shapes our feelings, 
judgments, choices, and actions"; thus we must be careful not to 
become prisoners of our own language, " 'suspended in webs of sig-
nificance' that we ourselves have spun."72 Because each model car-
ries its own set of unwritten assumptions, the choice between 
we are predisposed to favor the person, out of respect for his moral autonomy and 
human dignity •... 
. • • In family law, however, the Mill paradigm often breaks down, because in family 
law conflicts are often not between a person and the state but between one person and 
another person. 
Id. 
70. Of course, this description of the different models magnifies their differences, 
whereas in reality the boundaries between these modes of discourse are somewhat blurry. 
The market model, for example, relies upon the protection of both private property and 
freedom of contract, see Radin, supra note 44, at 1888 {"The legal infrastructure of capitalism 
- what is required for a functioning laissez-faire market system - includes not merely pri-
vate property, but private property plus free contract."), and intentional visions of 
parenthood breach the artificial barrier between family law and contract law. 
71. Mary Ann Glendon writes that the " 'legalization' of popular culture is both cause 
and consequence of our increasing tendency to look to law as an expression and carrier of the 
few values that are widely shared in our society." MARY ANN GLENDON, R101ITS TALK! 
THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 3 {1991). 
72. Id. at 11; see also Katherine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 
295 (1988) (arguing that the law, by focusing upon parental responsibility rather than paren-
tal rights, should "express a view of parenthood based upon the cycle of gift rather than the 
cycle of exchange"). Another commentator has described the impact of selecting the market 
model as follows: 
Market rhetoric ..• would indeed transform the texture of the human world. This rheto-
ric leads us to view politics as just rent seeking, reproductive capacity as just a scarce 
good for which there is a high demand, and the repugnance of slavery as just a cost. To 
acce.Pt these views is to accept the [inferior] conception of human flourishing they imply 
... tand] [a]n inferior conception of human flourishing disables us from conceptualizing 
the world rightly. 
Radin, supra note 44, at 1884. 
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models is more than just a choice about what language to use: it is 
more fundamentally a choice about which questions to ask and 
which to mask, about what to reveal and what to conceal. 
